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Appointed by Court.

out
eounsd for rPpresenting
the ''reasonable snm"
onlinn rily used in detertransbet\\'een ruunsel and a soln~nt
but should be
conoidenttiou of the amounts deemed proper as
for the services of eourt-appointed counsPl in
nnd thP eoJnrwusation pnid to public offi' alH1 the rode sl'dion must also hP read in the
relnterl
such as Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068,
(h), whieh makes it the continuing duty of counst:l to
the "defenst>lcss" rl'g·ardless of personal consideraEvidence-Judicial Notice- Officers- Compensation.-It is
,.,,,mlwn knowledg<' that the ('Ompensation generally paid to
attorney;s and public defenders is substantially lower
the amount that would be deemed appropriate for cor!e;::·a l work for private clients.
[3]

Law-Arraignment-Right to CounseL-If an acof $1,000 in cash and had no other
he could not be deemed a p(•rson "unable to emcounsel'' within the puniew of Pen. Code, § 987, relating
of accused to counsel.

[41 Mandamus-To Courts-Application of Rules.-Jn a proceedmamlamus to compel the'
court to allow addi-

compcnsation to court-appointed counsel for representnn indigPnt defendant in a nmrdPr case, it could not be
that such court abused its discretion in allowing' $1,000
H'n'iePs performed by tiYo attorneys where such sum
not he declared llYll'<'asoru1ble when compared with
dl'<'lliNl nppropriatP for like services under like cirtu:nstances~

Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law,
1;)7.

s187; Am.Jur., Attorneys

References: [1] Attorneys, ~ 87; [2] Evidence, § 43;
[3j Criminal Law, 3189; [4] Mandamus, §44.
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PHOCBBDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Humboldt County to allow additional compensation for
seniees rendered
eourt~appointed counseL 'Writ denied.
Arthur W Ilill and Norman C. Cissna, ln pro. per., for
Petitioners.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and
Ji'rederiek G. Girard, Deputy Attorneys General, and Harold
L. Hammond, District Attorney (Humboldt), for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Petitioners seek a writ of mandate to compel the respondent court to allow ''additional compensation
to petitioners for services and expenses" while acting as the
court-appointed counsel for Ezra Linwood Witham. The petition was originally filed in the District Court of Appeal, which
court issued an alternative ·writ, and ordered a reference to
ascertain the facts.
There is no dispute hrrc concerning the essential facts.
Petitioners Hill and Cissna were appointed by the respondent
court to defend \Vitham, who was charged with murder,
assault with intent to commit murder, and kidnapping. Petitioner Hill had previously represented ·witham by court
appointment at the preliminary hearing. It is conceded that
petitioners were experienced attorneys and prominent members of the bar of their county; and that they ably represented
Witham on his trial. 'l'he record before us does not show the
precise result of the trial. Apparently Witham was convicted
but the death sentence was not imposed. Petitioner Hill, who
had represented ·witham at the preliminary hearing, also acted
for him at the arraignment, and during eight days of trial and
one night session. In addition it appears that he spent 25Vz
hours in preparation for trial. 'l'his time included conferences
with ·witham and his witnesses, researching legal points, and
drawing jury instructions, but did not include time spent
in reviewing the transcript. Petitioner Cissna performed
somewhat similar services except for the fact that he did not
represent \Vitham at the time of the preliminary hearing.
Following the trial, petitioners applied to the respondent
court for reasonable compensation under the provisions of
section 987a of the Penal Code. They claimed that an award
of $5,000 to each petitioner, or a total of $10,000 for both
petitioners, would be reasonable compensation within the
meaning of said section. After a hearing, the respondent
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found that $500 was a "reasonable sum" to be awarded
to
petitioner, or a total of $1,000 for both petitioners,
and ordered that amount paid from county funds. Petitioners
then filed their petition for a writ of mandate to compel the
allowance of a greater sum.
The demurrer and answer to the petition have raised the
of the availability of the writ of mandate to control
the discretion of the respondent court. 'vVe have concluded,
hov1ever, that regardless of the procedural question of whether
would be available in the event of a showing of an
abuse of discretion, no such showing has been made here, and
the writ must be denied.
the time involved, the pertinent provisions of section
987a of the Penal Code read as follows:
''In any case in which counsel is assigned in the superior
court to defend a person who is charged therein with crime,
... such counsel . . . shall receive a reasonable sum for compensation and for necessary expenses, the amount of which
shall be determined by the court, . . . . " (Stats. 1951, chap.
1160, §2.)
[la] The question of whether the respondent court abused
its discretion depends upon the meaning of the phrase ''reasonable sum" appearing in the above section. It is the theory
of petitioners that the total award of $1,000 is so unreasonably
small as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Their view of
the meaning of the phrase 'reasonable sum'' is apparently
based upon the criteria ordinarily used in determining what
constitutes a reasonable fee in a private transaction between
counsel and a solvent client. We are of the opinion, however,
that such criteria are of but little assistance here, as the transaction is not a private transaction and the client is not a
solvent client but one who ''is unable to employ counseL''
(Pen. Code, § 987.) As we view the situation, it is essentially
one where court-appointed counsel, as officers of the court,
perform a public service at public expense. More appropriate
therefore, may be found by considering the amounts
deemrd proper as compensation for the services of courtappointed counsel in other jurisdictions, and also by considering
compensation paid to public officers generally. Furthermore, section 987 a must be read in tlw light of related
statutes, and of the history of the development of the statutory
provi:sion~<; for the payment of compensation to appointed
counsel. All of the foregoing factors have a bearing upon the
legislative purpose and meaning in enacting the section.
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for the com-

nance,
of public
1941,
provide that
able sum" for their
"the
amount of vYhich shall be determined
the court." ( Stats.
1951,
§ 2.) It is
both before the
enactment of the section in 1941 and at all times
section
6068, subdivision
, of the Butiiness and Profrssions Code
has
that "It is the
. . . (h)
to himself,
Thus the continuing duty of counsel to
"defenseless,"
regardless of personal considerations, must be
in mind
in measuring the extent of the right which the Legislature
intended to confer upon counsel by the use of the phrase
''reasonable sum'' in section 987 a.
\Ve now turn to the consideration of the statutes of other
jurisdictions providing for the compensation of courtappointed counsel. Respondent has furnished a compilation
of such statutes, and petitioners have not challenged its accuracy. It appears that in 10 states
Connecticut,
Delaware, ]'lorida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah) no
is made for the
compensation of court-appointed counsel in any case. In five
states (Massachusetts, Mississippi, New ,Jersey, ~orth Carolina, and Pennsylvania) no
is made for such compensation except in homicide cases.
states where compensation is allowed (Illinois, Iowa,
lVIinnesota, Rhode
Island, Texas, \V ashington, and
a per diem fee
for trial
has been fixed by
and the average per
diem in these states is slightl~· in excess of
The highest
such per diem is provided in Minnesota and \Visconsin, where
$50 is allowed for each trial
and a lesser amonnt for each
day spent in preparation.
Stats.
chap. 611.07;
Wis. Stats. 195], § 357.26.) In 15 states where compensation
is allowed, no fixed per diem is
but the trial court
fixes the total fee within the maximum limits permitted by
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th,•se states than that allowed
tllum allowed for the
it appears that the
in tlH•se 15 states is

for cxpcnsPs. (New York Code
as amended in 1949.) The next

iu Pennsylvania. where the
's Pa.

:-; 1'\V

Stats. ann., tit. 19,
the above-mentioned
the
of $1,500
0

f
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to Pem,sylnmia. Obviously, tlw
Ll of these 15 states is
Code of Alabama 1940, tit. J 5,
"\ets of .\rimn:sas
Art 276; Georgia
Nov.-D,•z:. Sessiou 1D5:l, p. 478; Illiuois
Stats.
§ 730; :Mississippi
as ameHde([ 19:"50; ?\evacla $300,
1!!4:3-1949, § 11::!.57; Ne>Y IIampN. H. 1942, chap. 428, § 3; Okla1951, tit. 22, § 1271; Oregon $150,
tit. 14, § 1:35.330; South Dakota $50,
tit.
:l.:t-.1901; Yirginia, $50, Colle of
iL 14. § l±-181, as amrnclell in 1954; ·west Vir\Y. Ya. Colle 193.3 allno., chap. G2, § 6190; ·wyoming
Stats. 1945, § 10-806, as amended in
is tln1s apparent that the states last mentionrd haye
to flx the comrwnsatiou to be paid
eonllscl from public funds upon the same
compensation is fixed in private transactions behn'i·l! (·omJst>l and solYcnt clients.

F'nrthennore, petitioners

(·alled onr attention to any case in which the comof
eonnsel has bceH fixed on that
including the 14 states ·which, like
compensation but do not prescribe by
nxecl per diem or maximum fee.
Idaho,
:\Iary Ia Jl(1,
1\Ii rh ig;Ut, l\fon tana,
,Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island,
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[2] With
to the compensation of public officers,
it is a matter of common knowledge that the compensation
generally paid to district attorneys and public defenders is
substantially lower than the amount that would be deemed
appropriate for corresponding legal work for private clients.
To illustrate, it is only necessary to consider the salary
provided at the time for the district attorney of the county
in question, and the salary which has since been provided
there for the newly created office of public defender. The
salary of the district attorney was $9,000 per year, and he
was not permitted to engage in private practice. The salary
of the public defender is $4,800 per year, and he is permitted
to engage in private practice, but he must maintain his
office at his own expense for the performance of his public
duties.
Petitioners cite the minimum fee schedule adopted by
the bar of their county, which prescribes a minimum fee of
$750 for representing a defendant charged with murder, and
a minimum fee of $250 for representing a defendant charged
with any other felony. While such minimum fee schedule
may have some bearing in determining appropriate compensation in a private transaction between counsel and a
solvent client, such is not the case here. [3] It should be
noted in this connection that if the accused had been possessed of $1,000 in cash and had no other obligations, he
could not have been deemed to be, in any fair sense of the
term, a person "unable to employ counsel" (Pen. Code,
§ 987) ; and more particularly in view of the above-mentioned duty imposed upon counsel by section 6068, subdivision (h), of the Business and Professions Code. Is it
reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended that the
accused who is possessed of $1,000 should be compelled to obtain private counsel out of his own funds, while the accused
who is entirely without funds should be entitled to courtappointed counsel who would receive compensation out of
public funds in a much greater amount? We believe that
the question answers itself.
[lb] For the reasons stated, we conclude that the criteria
to be used in determining a "reasonable sum" for compensation in this type of case are not the same as those ordinarily
used in fixing fees for services performed as the result of a
private transaction between counsel and a solvent client.
On the contrary, we believe that it was intended that such
compensation should be determined in the light of counsel's
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duty to the "defenseless" (Bus. & P mf. Code,
subd. (h)) ; and that the more reliable guides for the
detennination of proper compensation for court-appointed
under our statute are to be found by considering
the statutory provisions of other jurisdictions for compenin such cases, and by considering the general level
of compensation paid to public officers for performing legal
in the prosecution and defense of criminal proceedings. [ 4] Giving due consideration to these criteria, it cannot
said that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the total sum of $1,000 for the services performed by
·while the award of a somewhat greater amount
have been sustained as being within the discretion of
the trial court, it seems entirely clear that the sum awarded
cannot be declared unreasonable when compared with the
amonnts deemed appropriate as compensation for like serYices under like circumstances.
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory
wriJ
denied.
~

C. J., Traynor, .J., and McComb, J., concurred .

•J., concurred in the judgment.
CAH'l'ER, .J.-I dissent.
The major premise of the majority opinion is that the legislation (Pen. Code, § 987a) requiring the payment from public
funds of counsel appointed to defend indigent defendants
in eri ntinal eases does not mean what it says when it specifies
that "reasonable" fees should be allowed. It says that the
test is not what would be reasonable if the defendant had the
funds to employ counsel. The test giYen is something less than
that but no other criterion is given except to compare the
amounts allowed in other states or paid to a public defender.
That is not and should not be the test, and, as applied here,
the amount allowed is patently inadequate. 'l'he statute reI!Uire;.; that the fees be "reasonable," a question later discussed, and it was adopted in a background of much research
and effort on the part of lawyPrs, judges and others interested
in PndPavorillg to make real and efl'eetllal the eonst itutionally
guara11teed right to <'Ottnsel. SPetion 987a should he 1nterpret
in that light rath<'t" than U1Hl1•t· the t1·~t liS1~<l by the
majority whieh is that the fee is more than Jtothing bnt Jess
than the usual and reasonable amount becnnse various statrs
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have refused to allow a sufficient amount
Since \Yhen has it become
fornia must follow other states in
tion of liberal
however, the
below what

far

to
proven
criminals, it is
the State's
to
ancl to
uphold the rights of all criminal defendants until the burden
of proof
them has been
established. ~Where
these defendants are impoverishecl or bankrupt, some provision for
assistance in their eases must be made. If such
a situation appears ridiculous, then the
must
be imaginecl: a case in which a poor person is
in a criminal proceeding·, with no one to defenrl
interests. Such a picture would be at
variance with
the underlying spirit of our systrm of jurisprudence."
(46 Jour. Crim. Law, Crim. & Pol. Sci., 199, 200, 205.) It is
said: "Payment of appointrd counsel varit's strikingly, from
five dollars to one thousand dollars,
on the serYice
ancl the state. A more realistic examination of this problem
is essential if the right to counsel as extended in theory is to
become equally substantial in practice.''
, The Right
to Counsel in American
p. 139.) And: "Payment of
connected with the duty to
counsel is a
appoint counsel and the qualit:' of serYicc furnished by
that one
counsel. It is a "\Yell-established Ameriean
should be paid for work done at the
and for the
benefit of, others. :\fevertlwlcss, from an
of the legal profession, like medical
in analogous
circumstance,, have given freely of their services to those facing criminal prosecution. ~Willingness to serve for absurdly
low fees and upon insubstantial
must be classed with
the 'volunteered' defense as evidence of legal humanitarianism.
*''The author is associated with Go1·ernment and International Rela·
tions at the University of Connecticut. He was formerly with the cor·
responding department at Rutgers University where he had done his
post-graduate studies. At the same time he lectured in The Dep 't
of History and Political Science in Rutgers Univ.
at Rutgers.
His prc,·ious effort in the field of criminal law was an
on 'Public
Defenders in Connecticut,' which first
State Government
nnd was
in the Congressional
" ( 46 .Jour.
Crim. Law,
& Pol. Sci., 199.)
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as the practice of law has become a
in large cities and as the nation has moved tovvard
and urbanization, the close contaet which
once enjoyed with the general public haR been
seyerely weakened.
of defending prisoners without
of payseemc; unfair to most
; to some
a real
'l'heir objection is that most people will not peJ'form useful tasks without pay; when charitable medical care
the answer is that doctors can give a short time
or each week to needy individuals and still maintain
income, whereas lawyers, once appointed, must
all or nearly all of their time to a pending ease, sometimes with the prospeet of the trial lasting for week:,,
"Whether resulting from the greater influence of state bar
upon state governments or from some other cause,
statutory provisions of a sort exist in most states for the paynwnt of appointed counsel, but appointed counsel in federal
eourts continues to go unre1varcled by Congress . . . . In genit can be said that the payments allowed by the various
are far below the fees which most attorneys would
although numerous exceptions to such a statement can
he found . . . .
'' rn the absence of a statutory provision there is no duty
a county to pay appointed counsel. This attitude is
on the argument that the attorney is discharging a
duty, a duty as an officer of the court, or a burden
assmned with a lawyer's oath, or simply that there is no oblion the part of the county. 'l'wo exceptions to this
are provided by the highest courts of Indiana and
Wisconsin. In each, statutes which denied any duty of the
t:mmties to pay attorneys appointed by the eonrt \vere held
in n1lid. The subject of payment for appointed counsel 1vill
receive inereased attention as the practice of
counsel becomes n:wre general. Certainly the
situation is highly unsatisfactory." (I d., p. 135.)
Samuel Hub in of the Maryland Bar has this to say: ''In most
criminal eases there is more or less unequal combat bet\Yeen
the accused on the one hand and the forces of the state on the
otl1er. 'fhis inequality is so glaring that it is not unusual for
the average citizen to assert that the courts exist not for the
of all regardless of wealth or power, bnt for the benefit
of the fortunate few as against the many. 'rhis is especially
true in the case of the destitute who have no adequate facilities
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for their legal defense and for the safeguarding of their rights.
There are no adequate legal facilities available for this purpose without cost to the accused. All destitute persons charged
with crime should be able to obtain justice in our courts. They
should be given adequate counsel and, what is of equal
importance, means of making investigations, in order that the
truth in the case may be brought to the attention of the court
and jury, and a proper verdict and sentence rendered. . ..
''One of the weaknesses of the assignment system is the fact
that the able and experienced lawyers do not care for such
appointments. The system leads to abuse and favoritism if
the attorney is compensated, and if there is no compensation
the system has little value. There are comparatively few
lawyers with extensive experience in criminal practice, and
lawyers in civil practice rarely have the experience to handle
criminal cases adequately. If the fees are small the interest
of the attorney is only half-hearted, and he will often advise
the client to plead guilty, giving as his reason that by avoiding
a protracted trial the prisoner is more likely to receive leniency
than if he enters a plea of 'not guilty'. The system rarely
works satisfactorily . . . .
"Legal assistance to the destitute in criminal cases is a
matter affecting the well-being of the whole community. It is
important that the innocent be adequately protected. It is
also important that the guilty be justly treated. To this end
the poor man charged with crime should be provided with
adequate legal protection without cost. Such a provision will
dissipate the idea that only the rich can avail themselves of
their legal rights, and it will mark a notable step forward in
the proper administration of justice throughout the country."
(39 Am. Bar Assn. Jour. 893.) The Honorable Henry P.
Chandler, Director, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, in discussing the representation of indigent defendants
in criminal cases in the federal courts, says: ''But notwithstanding the law, the practical provision for counsel in the
case of poor persons accused of crime in the federal courts,
is only rudimentary and inefficient, brcause there is no provision for compensating counsel appointed by the courts to
represent such persons, or even to reimburse them for their
ordinary expenses incurred in the defense . . . .
"For approximately twenty years now the conviction has
been growing among persons acquainted with the conduct of
criminal cases in the federal courts, that for poor persons the
spirit of the Sixth Amendment that persons accused of crime
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ihc
at\~'~' ol' <~ollllSPl for t IH•ir dPJ'elJ"(', is far
fulfillr:d. In f<wl il1r; laeh of provi,;ion for r•nm.
eonnscl appointP<1 lo defPnd pnor persons a<;eusc(l
crime or even pa,ving; t hei1· out.nf-pneket expensetl, has
to be regarde<l as perhaps the most serious single defect
tlH; federal jwlieial
" (28 Cal. State Bar .Jour.

1\Ir. Harry Graham Balter, an eminent nwmber of the
Los Angeles Bar, statrs: "To a considerable extent, in the
courts, the traditional concept of assignment of inmembers of the Bar to represent indigent accused,
wtt hont being compensated, bnt as a gratuitous discharge of
th·· la·wyer's professional obligation, has gradually given
to the more realistic concept of either (a) the Public
, supported by taxes, (b) the Voluntary Defender,
temed after the Public Defender System, but supported
philanthropic funds oe by Community Chest funds, or
( c:) appointment of counsel in a specific case, but with pro\"i.;;ions for reasonable compensation. In spite of the decided
tr<'lJ(t towards more systematized representation for indigent
that the constitutional safeguard of adequate legal
representation does not always measure up to the standards
~et
the Supreme Court of the United States, is evidenced
the 'flood of petitions' reaching that court, alleging depYi\·ation of the accused in some of the state courts of due
proeess of law and other constitutional rights, usually centeraround the question of proper legal representation afforded the accused." (Emphasis added; 24 Cal. State Bar
,J<;ur 114.) In regard to the fees paid in other states to apcounsel Emery A. Brownell, a leader in the field of
aid, states: ''Only twenty-three states provide any compc·wmtion for attorneys in other than capital cases. In a
of these states the maximum fees allowed are grossly
u memunrrative---especially when it is considered that there
is llO compensation for preparation before the trial except in
\Yi~eonsin, all(l no provision for expenses except in California
ancl \Yisconsin." (13mwnell, Legal Aid in the United States,
p. 12±.)

Section 987a must be viewed in the lig·ht of the foregoing
thoughts. Manifestly its object was to assure more efficient
and satisfactory representation of indigent defendants in
(·J·huinal cases. 1f this court and the superior courts allow
token fees or fees that bear no relation to the services
performed, as does the majority here, the object of tht>
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section defeated. 'l'hc situation that gave rise to its passage
has
been ameliorated.
Section 987 a states that a reasonable fee should be allowed.
'l'hat is a
long known in the law and many factors
are taken into consideration. ''The reasonableness of the fee
or allowed must be determined like any other fact
in issue in
judicial proceeding, and in making such dei ermination all the facts and circumstances of the particular
case,
so far as applicable those enumerated herein
below, must be taken into consideration.
''In
·what is a reasonable attorney's fee or
allowance for legal services rendered, many and varied elements or factors are to be considered. At\.mong the principal
elements or factors to be considered are the amount and
character of the services rendered, the nature, and importance
of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered, the degree of responsibility imposed on, or incurred
by, the attorney, the amount of money or the value of the
property affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment, the degree of professional ability, skill, and experience called for and exercised in the performance of the
services, and the professional character, qualifications, and
standing of the attorney, and also the amount recovered.
''The labor, time, and trouble involved and expended by
the attorney, are also elements to be considered, although
it has been held that the element of time is of minor importance, and standing alone is not a basis for compensation.
'l'ime, in this connection, means the length of time employed
by the attorney in preparation for, and trial of, the case,
and not the length of the time the litigation has been permitted to remain in court. . . .
''The customary charges or fees, if any, for similar services is an important element to be considered in determining
the reasonable value of services rendered by an attorney, and
not what the attorney thinks is reasonable; and speaking
generally, in the absence of a special contract, an attorney
is entitled to the amount that is reasonable and customary
in the same vicinity for services of like kind, performed under
like conditions and circumstances. Employment of an attorney with knowledge of his rate of charges. ·without stipulating as to price, may be regarded as evidence of a contract to pay at such rate; but the fact that the client, when
informed, during the pendency of a suit, of the charges his
attorney is making, fails to express dissatisfaction, is not an
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and does not bind him to 11ay
future services in the same suit. An llllorder fixing the eompensation of an
for
rendered eannot control the amount of reeoyery
action for such serYices.
the
ll\ llllll1 u lll
assoeiation is
n', but
the reasonable Yalue of the srniees; aJH1
of a special or implied
a elient is
not
bound to pay aceorcling to the rates preseribed
Jlw rnles and regulations of the bar assoeiation . . . .
''Financial ability or
of chent. TllC' financial
of a client may be taken into consideration, not for
the purpose of enhancing the amount above a reasonable eombut for the purpose of determining whether or not
able to pay a fair and just eompensation for the services
and as a factor in determini11g the Yalne of the attoror as an incident in ascertaining the importance
of the interests ilwolYed in the litigation. The
of a litigant is ordinarily entitled to no considerafixing the value of his attorney's senices, although
sometimes be taken into consideration in fixing the
of the legal serYires rendered." (7 C.J.S., Attorney
§ 191 ) (2).) (See also 5 :\m ..Tnr., Attorueys at
1D8.) (See 143 A.L.R. 672.) 1\o doubt many of those
\Yere taken into eonsideration by the bar association
of the county where the trial was held when it adopted a minimnm fee schedule. The amount awarded here ($500 for each
was $250 less than that minimum. 'rhe members of
in adopting the schedule were \Yell aware of all the
""''rhra(1 costs and other factors to be considered and which
appropriate to the community. 'rhey knew more about
dw~r
than the courts. '!.'he schedule lists "minimum"
fpes which means the lrast that should be charged under tlw
mosi fayorable circumstanecs and still retain a S('mblanee of
eon·r>]ation between the services performed and the compens:u ion received. The fees here allowed are plainly inadc>quate.
TlH: trial consnmed eight days which means an allmYance of a
gross amount of about $6:) per (lay without allowiug anything
fo1·
retainer or fee for preparation work essential to the
of any case to a court or jury, and no allowance
Wil~ made for office overhead or othc>r expense in tlw prepara-
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The salaries paid district attorneys and public defenders
are not a proper measure for determining the compensation
allowable to attorneys appointed to defend those charged with
crime. "With such positions go prestige and a certain steady
income which may in a measure account for the difference
between it and the cost of handling the legal work on a piece
basis. These officials have no overhead expense as do attorneys
engaged in private practice and all expenses incurred by such
officials in the investigation and hand! ing of criminal cases
arc paid out of public fum1s. Moreover, it is a matter of
common knowledge that the salaries of government officers do
not match what they would receive for similar work in private
activities whether it be legal or administrative work.
I would issue the writ on the ground that the court abused
its discretion although I believe the order is appealable. It is
not an order made after judgment substantially affecting the
judgment but is a final order in a special civil proceeding
which is made appealable by section 963, subdivision 1, of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
Schauer, .J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 19100.

In Bank.

Feb. 10, 1956.]

GEORGE G. EICHELBERGER et al., Appellants, v. CITY
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LEWIS WESCO'rT, Appellant, v. CITY OF BERKELEY
et al., Respondents.
[1] Pensions-Amount.-Where a pension statute states that the
pension shall be a percentage of the average salary attached
to the rank held by the employee before retirement, it is construed as providing for a fluctuating pension which increases
or decreases as the salaries paid to active employees increase
or decrease.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Fire Department----Pensions.-Where
a city ordinance expressly provides that pensions to retired
firemen shall not fluetuate up or down in accordance with pay
fluctuations of aetive firemen, retired firemen are not en-

[l] SPe Cal.Jur., Pensions, § 6; Am.Jur., PPnsions, ~§ 32, 33.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Pensions, § 8; [2. il] Municipal Corporations, § 324(5).

